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AUTHOR:

VERRALL, A.W.

TITLE:

"ON EDITING AESCHYLUS"

PLACE:

LONDON

DATE:

1892

Master Negative #

93-81546-6

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Verrall, Arthur Woollgar, 1851-1912.
"On editing Aeschylus," a reply, by A.W. Verrall... London, Macmillan, 1892.
28 p. 22 cm.

58703

Restrictions on Use:

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FILM SIZE: 35 REDUCTION RATIO: 11x
IMAGE PLACEMENT: IA (IIA) IB IIB
DATE FILMED: 7-2-93 INITIALS SS
FILMED BY: RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS, INC WOODBRIDGE, CT

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Pamphlet

"ON EDITING AESCHYLUS."

A REPLY

BY

A. W. VERRALL, LITT.D.
FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

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Price One Shilling net.

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AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

"ON EDITING AESCHYLUS."

A REPLY.

"We parted last night in the middle of a controversy and are rageing to resume it. Where is our redoubtable antagonist?"

Mrs Mountstuart wheeled Professor Crooklyn round to accompany Vernon.

"We," she said, "are for modern English scholarship opposed to the champion of German."

"The contrary," observed Professor Crooklyn.

"Oh. We," she corrected the error serenely, "are for German scholarship, opposed to English."

"Certain editions."

"We defend certain editions."

"'Defend' is a term of imperfect application to my position, ma'am."

"My dear professor, you have in Dr Middleton a match for you in conscientious pugnacity, and you will not waste it upon me...."

Mrs Mountstuart fell back to Laetitia, saying "He pores over a little inexactitude in phrases and pecks at it like a domestic fowl."

GEORGE MEREDITH. *The Egoist.*

351110

Mr Walter Headlam has recently published[1], under the title "On editing Aeschylus. A criticism," a solid pamphlet of 159 pages against my writings and me. When the book was announced, I did not expect that it would give me any reason or excuse for departing from the rule, that a review should be left, without remark, to the judgment of numbers and time, and that the author criticised has nothing to do but to correct his opinions where he sees reason, and, as occasion offers, to correct his works. I am not, I hope, so fatuous or so obstinate as to reject correction. Like all men of any candour, I am aware that I make mistakes. I supposed that Mr Headlam would note some points on which I knew that I had gone wrong, and would satisfy me that I was wrong in other places which I had not suspected. Of course I also expected to find many arguments which would not convince me. Of these last, had such been the purport and character of the book, I should have taken no notice, having never thought that public controversy between a particular pair of students, who may be in no way specially fitted to enlighten each other or to strike out truth between them, has any advantage over peaceable separate work. As to the points on which I was convinced, I might or might not have thought it desirable to make acknowledgment at once, but should probably have waited for convenient opportunities.

When the book came to my hands a fortnight ago, I saw at a glance that the tone of it was such as is now seldom used between students who merely disagree where difference is permissible. This however did not surprise or annoy me. From what I had seen of Mr Headlam in another case, I did not expect to find him in my own case a very ceremonious critic. But when I read continuously, I found, to my astonishment, that the book as a whole purported to be not a discussion of

[1] London, David Nutt, 1891.

points debateable, but an arraignment of me personally, not merely for such ignorance in elementary parts of my subject as, considering my position, might well be regarded as a moral offence, but for such wilful persistence in ignorance as in a professional writer would be nothing less than dishonest. This was another thing altogether and opened at once the question of answering.

I am not indeed afraid that these charges will be believed against me by any one well acquainted either with me or with my work, or by any competent person, who has the leisure and patience to go fully into the matter. If it were possible to create a court for such cases, Mr Headlam's statements would be actionable; and I should commence an action immediately and with confidence. I should be almost bound to do so; for whether Mr Headlam sees it or not (I think he does) his book is libellous. The question is whether, this being so, I am not now bound, for want of a court, to make some answer in print, for the credit of my position, and in consideration of the fact that among busy men mere assertion, even if not credible nor consciously believed, is apt, if not contradicted, to leave a vague impression. I have decided on the whole that I ought to answer, not without misgiving, for the whole proceeding is scandalous and unpleasant. But if there is ground for displeasure, let the blame be laid where it ought.

My critic, everywhere stern and severe, as becomes one who is demanding justice upon a criminal, is nowhere more peremptory or more confident than in his remarks upon my treatment of the pronoun *αὐτός*. In the course of my notes on the two plays of Aeschylus, which I have published as part of a complete edition of the poet, I have repeatedly made or implied a statement, which is given most fully in the note to *Theb.* 656:

> As has been observed before, the use of *αὐτός*, unless for emphasis, is very rare in Aeschylus. As unemphatic pronouns can be supplied from the context, the insertion of them is a sacrifice of force to simplicity and clearness, and alien to the weighty and sententious Aeschylean style. With the light enclitic pronouns *νιν*, *σφε* etc., this is not felt, but *αὐτός*, if needless, has an incongruous effect, and where it occurs an emphasis is to be looked for.

Mr Headlam cites from my two commentaries fifteen notes to this effect, and then continues thus (p. 57):

> Now all this is due either to unverified assumption or to deliberate disregard of the evidence. The truth is stated by Dindorf (*Lex. Aesch. s. v. αὐτός p.* 52): *αὐτός is*, sed in casibus tantum obliquis, neque in initio sententiae, sed post unum vel plura vocabula, et plerumque in diverbiis, rarius in melicis,...
>
> According to his list there are in Aeschylus certainly not more than thirty-one instances of *αὐτός* emphatic in the oblique cases, and certainly not less than 44 unemphatic. Reference to that list will save me from disproving the assertion that 'except with emphasis *αὐτός* is exceedingly rare in Aeschylus', as it might have saved Dr Verrall from making that assertion. Though indeed a lexicon would be of little use to the judgment that could propound such interpretations.

Let it now be carefully observed, that with the last sentence, the remark on my judgment, I have no concern whatever, and will assume that it is true, as indeed in one sense it is. It simply expresses, in language of no common asperity, the fact that Mr Headlam disagrees with me. I do not dispute this; so far as the question is one of judgment, it is no subject for polemics. The statement which I impugn is no matter of opinion but of fact. It is the false and injurious statement, that *all this is due either to unverified assumption or to deliberate disregard of the evidence,* interpreted as it is by the rest of the passage and the remark about Dindorf's *Lexicon.* Statements, or rather accusations, like this are scattered all over the book. There is nothing to indicate that Mr Headlam considers this one any weaker than the rest, nor is it. I choose it as a specimen because it is especially gross. And I say that it is a libel.

That it has one quality of a libel, that it is defamatory and injurious to my character, I need not labour to prove. It is meant to be so. If my remarks upon the use of *αὐτός* in Aeschylus were made negligently, the negligence is of that kind which deserves a different name. To plead an oversight would be ridiculous. The question goes to the very roots of my author's language and style. I came to it fifteen times in the two plays, and had therefore at least fifteen opportunities of reflexion. Moreover, if I was really studying Aeschylus as a

whole, as I said that I was, with the intention of editing the whole, I must be finding other such opportunities frequently. The means of investigation were ready to hand. If then under these circumstances I went on making my statement, either without consulting a lexicon (*i.e.* upon an "unverified assumption"), or knowing that the lexicon was against me but resolved to ignore it (*i.e.* in "deliberate disregard of the evidence"), there is an end of my moral competence to write profitably about Aeschylus or any subject whatever. Mr Headlam's charge then is defamatory.

In the next place, it is absolutely untrue. Since there is no way of proving this except to state what I actually did, and since no one knows this fully, or well could know it, except myself, I hope I shall be excused, if I speak of my private work in a way which but for this necessity might be called obtrusive.

Doubts about the extent, to which the unemphatic *αὐτός* was used by Aeschylus and other poets, occurred to me first in the general course of my reading, and I had made many notes upon the subject. When I began to edit Aeschylus, it was necessary that, so far at least as his usage was concerned, I should go to the bottom of the matter. I read Aeschylus through, with this purpose among others in mind, completing and revising my notes on the point. I then took the list of examples in Dindorf's *Lexicon*, following here for a moment the scientific method recommended by Mr Headlam. And here I forgot to stop. If I had stopped here, it "might have saved" me from making my assertion. It might indeed. It would be a most saving and compendious method. It would save me (or any one) from making this (or any) assertion about the usage of Aeschylus. What need of it, if Dindorf's *Lexicon* is the final truth? However I went on. I examined again the examples of *αὐτός*, upwards of forty, which Dindorf classes together as unemphatic. I then took the list in Donaldson's index to Pindar (more than forty examples of the oblique cases) and spent many hours over that. I then read—for I wanted to observe several other things in connexion with *αὐτός* itself, and indices were not convenient helps—I then read, for this

purpose only, the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, the *Oedipus Coloneus*, and the *Antigone*, the *Medea* and Euripides here and there, several chapters of Thucydides, and other portions of prose authors. Having done this, and not before, I wrote, as I came to the passages, the notes on the subject, about a page in all, in the *Seven against Thebes* and the *Agamemnon*. Most of what is here said I could confirm by documentary evidence and the testimony of others; for the rest I can give only my word. There is nothing to boast of. No one can do more than his duty; but I think it will be allowed that I did not do less. Upon this single subject I spent at least a week.

And here in strictness my reply to this charge, on the question of its truth, should end. To set forth my investigations, or any part of them, is not to the point; nor does it matter whether my conclusions were completely right or completely wrong. But since, though this paper is necessarily personal, I am unwilling that it should contain nothing of interest apart from my personality, I will give here briefly the rest of the statement on *αὐτός* in Aeschylus, with which I have been prepared ever since I began to edit his works. Of passages in the two plays already published I shall say nothing. All these I had certainly considered, for I printed notes on them. It will be seen that the account which follows accords with the notes and is such as any one, reading the notes, would naturally suppose me to have projected. I have used here for convenience the numeration of Dindorf's *Poetae Scenici* and *Lexicon* to Aeschylus. In my edition I use that of Wecklein.

Let us first state the question. In fully developed Greek prose the oblique cases of *αὐτός*, having practically driven out of the field some archaic rivals, are used almost as freely as the English *him, her, them, it,* and constantly without any emphasis at all. The somewhat cumbrous dissyllable, for so light a point in the sentence, is not (to my thinking) among the advantages of Greek, and the composers of Attic prose may well have sometimes regretted the general abandonment of *σφε* and *νιν*, though uniformity had carried the day. However that may be, the Attic poets show no fondness for the unemphatic *αὐτός*. They maintain the exploded enclitics. They use

ellipse of the pronoun much more freely than would be convenient for prose-writers, whose first object is to be clear. They turn their sentences by preference so as not to need unemphatic pronouns. In short, from whatever motives, they manage, as compared with prose-writers, to do with very little of *αὐτός*. The poets differ slightly among themselves, and Aeschylus shows certainly not more inclination to be free with the word than others whom we should naturally match with him. It is therefore no idle enquiry, but one arising naturally out of the facts, whether, when he acts against his common inclination, he has not a motive for doing so, how far his lapses into *αὐτός* are really lapses, and how far acts of discretion. If we contrast the language of a prose-writer with that of a tragedian, even Thucydides with Euripides, no difference is more marked than the comparative rarity in the poet of sentences such as the last of these lines from Aeschylus (*Supp.* 302)

A. *τί οὖν ἔτευξεν ἄλλο δυσπότμῳ βοί;*
B. *βοηλάτην μυῶπα κινητήριον·*
A. *οἶστρον καλοῦσιν αὐτὸν οἱ Νείλου πέλας*[1].

Here, *prima facie*, *αὐτόν* appears to be used without any necessity at all. If it were not there, we should supply a pronoun mentally, and the meaning (it seems) would be the same. This is the "unemphatic *αὐτός*", the use of the pronoun, where by an enclitic, or by ellipse, or by turning the sentence differently, the meaning could be as well expressed without this pronoun. And the question is, how much of this use do we find in Aeschylus? I said and think that it is extremely rare.

That the classification in Dindorf, though true as far as it goes, is not exhaustive, would sufficiently appear from the fact that it includes as simply unemphatic the following case (*Pers.* 837):

ἀλλ' αὐτὸν εὐφρόνως σὺ πράϋνον λόγοις·
μόνης γάρ, οἶδα, σοῦ κλύων ἀνέξεται.

[1] The distribution of the dialogue is here immaterial. See Mr Tucker's note.

So says Darius to Atossa, requesting her to console the grief of Xerxes. Now surely we cannot say that the complexion of this sentence is precisely the same as if the poet had written *ἀλλ' εὐφρόνως σὺ πράϋνόν νιν.* The point is the special relation between the king and his mother, and this point is marked, in the most natural way, by the emphasis of the contrasted or correlated pronouns. It is Xerxes who has to be consoled; therefore Atossa, the only person to whom he will listen, must give the consolation. Both *σύ* and *αὐτόν* are emphatic, the one as much as the other: *σύ*, which is so by nature, is left to take care of itself; *αὐτόν* is reinforced by position in the sentence.

So again in *Eum.* 767, Orestes, promising that his spirit shall protect Athens against Argos, says:

αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὄντες ἐν τάφοις τότε
τοῖς τἀμὰ παρβαίνουσι νῦν ὁρκώματα
ἀμηχάνοισι πράξομεν δυσπραξίαις
ὁδοὺς ἀθύμους καὶ παρόρνιθας πόρους
τιθέντες, ὡς αὐτοῖσι μεταμέλῃ πόνος·
ὀρθουμένων δὲ καὶ πόλιν τὴν Παλλάδος
τιμῶσιν ἀεὶ τήνδε συμμάχῳ δορὶ
αὐτοῖσιν ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν εὐμενέστεροι. 774

Here, in the last line, the very position of *αὐτοῖσιν* shows that it is emphatic, and the connected emphasis of *ἡμεῖς* shows what the point is. The Athenians have bound to them, by eternal gratitude, one who is to become a chief hero ('patron-saint' is the nearest equivalent) of the Argives. So long, therefore, as they behave well to Athens, their own patron will be favourable in proportion to *them*; and if they try to assail his benefactors, *he* will use his power not against Athens but against *them*, so that *they themselves* (not Athens) shall have cause to repent of the enterprise. And this example is specially instructive, because it warns us not to be hasty in concluding that there is no point in the choice of a pronoun more weighty than usual. The structure of the verse directs us to the emphasis in *v.* 774: and when we have noted this, we can see what, if we had trained ourselves sufficiently in the habits of

Greek poetry, we should have felt before, that the weight of the pronoun is meant to tell in *v.* 771 also, although here it is not, or at least not equally, enforced by position: which is a caution not to be quick in trusting our first impressions on so delicate a matter.

Such a caution we need, for example, in another case (also classed by Dindorf, with all here mentioned, simply and without distinction as an example of "*αὐτός is*"), *Prom.* 680:

> βουκόλος δὲ γηγενὴς
> ἄκρατος ὀργὴν Ἄργος ὡμάρτει, πυκνοῖς
> ὄσσοις δεδορκὼς τοὺς ἐμοὺς κατὰ στίβους.
> ἀπροσδόκητος δ' αὐτὸν αἰφνίδιος μόρος
> τοῦ ζῆν ἀπεστέρησεν.

Here we can of course ignore the weight, which *αὐτός*, by the mere rarity of its occurrence in poetry, should carry to the ear. But, if we do, we miss the delicacy of the expression: *ἀπροσδόκητος δ' αὐτὸν κ.τ.λ.* is contrasted with *δεδορκὼς τοὺς ἐμοὺς κατὰ στίβους*: and the point made or suggested is, that while Argus was all eyes for *Io*, he was surprised by a sudden fate which annihilated *him*.

So again in *Prom.* 306:

> δέρκου θέαμα, τόνδε τὸν Διὸς φίλον,
> τὸν συγκαταστήσαντα τὴν τυραννίδα,
> οἵαις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πημοναῖσι κάμπτομαι.

If we say that *αὐτοῦ* here is without weight, we miss the very point and pathos of the verse, which lies in this, that the *friend of Zeus* should be so *bowed with torture* by *him*, by the very Zeus whom he served: the pronoun is as plainly emphatic, as if Aeschylus had written *αὐτοῦ τοῦ Διός*. Yet even this is counted as merely one instance of "*αὐτός is*."

So in *Eum.* 829:

> κἀγὼ πέποιθα Ζηνὶ, καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν;
> καὶ κλῆδας οἶδα δώματος μόνη θεῶν,
> ἐν ᾧ κεραυνός ἐστιν ἐσφραγισμένος.
> ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ δεῖ· σὺ δ' εὐπειθὴς ἐμοὶ κ.τ.λ.

It is surely not without importance to the feeling of this passage, that the poet does not use *αὐτός* habitually and constantly, as a prose-writer does. The emphasis which, owing to this parsimony, *αὐτοῦ* carries in itself, conveys exactly the meaning intended. "But there is no need of *it*." The weapon itself, the actual display of force, is not needed; it is enough, and more than enough, to hint that Athena, as is well known, could command it. Let the rebellious not wait for *her thunders*, but at once yield obediently to *her* (*αὐτοῦ—ἐμοί*).

Not less clear is it (in my opinion) that *αὐτά* has weight and significance in the following (*Prom.* 441):

> καίτοι θεοῖσι τοῖς νέοις τούτοις γέρα
> τίς ἄλλος ἢ 'γὼ παντελῶς διώρισεν;
> ἀλλ' αὐτὰ σιγῶ. καὶ γὰρ εἰδυίαισιν ἂν
> ὑμῖν λέγοιμι.

Would it have made no difference here, except to the metre, if Prometheus had said *ἀλλὰ σιγῶ τάδε*, and does he mean merely "I say nothing of them"? Surely not. In *ἀλλ' αὐτὰ σιγῶ* the pronoun, even by position, has a stress; since, metre apart, if no stress were meant, the order should be *ἀλλὰ σιγῶ αὐτά*. But *αὐτά*, 'the gifts *themselves*,' means 'the *actual* gifts,' 'the *specific* gifts,' and contributes an important quota to the sense. In English we should throw the meaning, with the emphasis, into the verb, 'But I do not *specify* the gifts.' The same thing might have been expressed a little more fully by *αὔθ' ἕκαστα*.

Again, *αὐτός* is naturally used, with the usual emphasis, when the sentence expresses an inversion of relations, a retribution in which some one is 'done by as he did,' or is treated *himself* as he proposed to treat *another*. This accounts for *Prom.* 358.

> ἐξ ὀμμάτων δ' ἤστραπτε γοργωπὸν σέλας,
> ὡς τὴν Διὸς τυραννίδ' ἐκπέρσων βίᾳ·
> ἀλλ' ἦλθεν αὐτῷ Ζηνὸς ἄγρυπνον βέλος,
> καταιβάτης κεραυνὸς ἐκπνέων φλόγα,
> ὃς αὐτὸν ἐξέπληξε κ.τ.λ.

Here the mere fact that the exceptional pronoun is used twice in a few lines is notice of some particular intention; and the intention is clear. Typhon proposed to 'storm the royalty of Zeus.' Instead of this, ἦλθεν αὐτῷ Ζηνὸς βέλος, it was the bolt of *Zeus* that descended upon *him*[1]: αὐτὸν in *v.* 360 echoes and reinforces the same idea.

Precisely similar is *Cho.* 119:

ΧΟ. τοῖς αἰτίοις νῦν τοῦ φόνου μεμνημένη—
ΗΛ. τί φῶ; δίδασκ' ἄπειρον ἐξηγουμένη.
ΧΟ. ἐλθεῖν τιν' αὐτοῖς δαίμον' ἢ βροτῶν τινὰ—
ΗΛ. πότερα δικαστὴν ἢ δικηφόρον λέγεις;
ΧΟ. ἁπλῶς τι φράζουσ', ὅστις ἀνταποκτενεῖ.

Here αὐτοῖς imports and anticipates the idea of retribution ('that an avenger, divine or human, may come to shed *their* blood'), which the speaker is afraid to put clearly, but, by the management of Electra, is led to make explicit in ἀνταποκτενεῖ.

With these passages for comparison we can see why αὐτῷ is right and desirable, even though the passage is lyric and the pronoun singularly prominent, in *Eum.* 320:

ὅστις δ' ἀλιτὼν ὥσπερ ὅδ' ἀνὴρ
χεῖρας φονίας ἐπικρύπτει,
μάρτυρες ὀρθαὶ τοῖσι θανοῦσιν
παραγιγνόμεναι πράκτορες αἵματος
αὐτῷ τελέως ἐφάνημεν.

The language is similar to that of the last example, and the point the same.

Alike in principle, though not precisely alike in form, is *Prom.* 909:

ἦ μὴν ἔτι Ζεὺς, καίπερ αὐθάδη φροιῶν,
ἔσται ταπεινός· τοῖον ἐξαρτύεται
γάμον γαμεῖν, ὃς αὐτὸν ἐκ τυραννίδος
θρόνων τ' ἄϊστον ἐκβαλεῖ.

[1] *Theb.* 431 πέποιθα δ' αὐτῷ, κ.τ.λ. belongs to this class, αὐτῷ going with ἥξεω. So far I agree with Mr Headlam. I wrote my note in this sense first, but afterwards changed it (erroneously as I have long since thought) for that printed.

Here the point is that the act of *Zeus* shall have for result the expulsion of *him* from his power; and αὐτόν should no more be classed as without emphasis than αὐτός would have been, if the sentence had taken the form δι' ὃν αὐτὸς ἐκ θρόνων ἐκπεσεῖται.

Of *Pers.* 436 τοιάδ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς (or αὐτοὺς) ἦλθε κ.τ.λ., and *Cho.* 712 ἀγ' αὐτὸν κ.τ.λ. it is needless to say anything. In each case an emphasis on the pronoun is proper, to prepare the ear for the intended sequel. In the first the antithesis is between αὐτοῖς and τοῖσδε, in the second between αὐτὸν and ὀπισθόπους 'conduct him..., and conduct his followers.'

From the nature of the case it must result that there will be examples in which the context does not determine whether the pronoun is meant to have weight or not, in which either way of reading is possible, and only a complete study of the poet's use as a whole will direct us which to prefer. Some of these I could not discuss properly without setting out the context to an inconvenient length. It will be sufficient to give one instance (*Pers.* 231), and to mention the rest.

ΑΤ. ὦ φίλοι, ποῦ τὰς Ἀθήνας φασὶν ἱδρῦσθαι χθονός;
ΧΟ. τῆλε πρὸς δυσμαῖς, ἄνακτος Ἡλίου φθινάσμασιν.
ΑΤ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἵμειρ' ἐμὸς παῖς τήνδε θηρᾶσαι πόλιν.
ΧΟ. πᾶσα γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν Ἑλλὰς βασιλέως ὑπήκοος.
ΑΤ. ὧδέ τις πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς ἀνδροπλήθεια στρατοῦ;
ΧΟ. καὶ στρατὸς τοιοῦτος, ἔρξας πολλὰ δὴ Μήδους κακά—
ΑΤ. καὶ τί πρὸς τούτοισιν ἄλλο; πλοῦτος ἐξαρκὴς δόμοις;
ΧΟ. ἀργύρου πηγή τις αὐτοῖς ἐστι, θησαυρὸς χθονός.

If this piece were prose, I should say that αὐτοῖς in both places had no special force, and that the meaning was simply 'they have.' Nor can it be proved that Aeschylus meant otherwise. All I can say is that, after a very careful investigation of the matter, in Aeschylus and elsewhere, I believe that, if he had not meant otherwise, he would have preferred to give his sentences another shape; that he used αὐτοῖς with consciousness, and meant, in the first place, 'Is Athens such a host *in itself*?' in the second place, 'They have a special resource *of their own*.'

The following, which are also ambiguous, I will mention only, to shew that I have not overlooked them, and believe them to fall within the general rule: *Prom.* 48, *Prom.* 454, 460, 487, *Prom.* 913, 918 (these two are connected), *Prom.* 853, *Pers.* 153, *Cho.* 1014, *Pers.* 767, 768.

In a few cases there is a question about the reading either of the line in which αὐτός occurs, or of the determining context, *e.g. Cho.* 883, *Prom.* 772, *Pers.* 191. None of these appear to be true exceptions.

There remain a few cases (*Pers.* 520 and *Pers.* 727 for instance) in which the use may be indistinguishable from that of ordinary prose. I will suppose these cases as many as twelve, though I think six would be too high a figure. I could suppose them twenty, and it would make no difference. It is clear that a usage, which might naturally have occurred in Aeschylus hundreds of times, if he had not regarded it as essentially prosaic and unfit for poetry unless under special circumstances, may with propriety be called 'extremely rare' in his works, if he admitted it a score of times, *a fortiori* if, as I hold, he really lapses into it not so often as once in a thousand lines.

I now return to the proper question of this paper. All the work above summarized I had gone through before I wrote upon αὐτός as I did; all this, and three or four times as much besides; for, as I have said, I went almost exhaustively into the usage of Pindar, and made considerable studies in other writers as well. Whether my conclusions were right or wrong is at present nothing to the purpose. I am in a position to prove that I did what I have described. The statement that what I wrote on αὐτός in the notes to the two plays 'is due either to unverified assumption or deliberate disregard of the evidence' is therefore absolutely untrue.

But it is not only injurious and untrue; it has also the third quality of a libel; it is, in the legal sense of the word, though in this sense only, malicious. This it would be, if it had been made merely without evidence. But there was ample evidence to the contrary, all the evidence, which, from the nature of the case, could naturally exist or be expected. My statements were limited to the usage of Aeschylus; I

went far beyond Aeschylus in investigation, as seemed to be proper; but I said nothing, and meant to say nothing, about any other writer. I proposed to edit the whole of Aeschylus, and had announced this intention. I had edited two plays. On all the passages bearing on the question of αὐτός, which occur in those plays, I had written notes, whether absurd or judicious is nothing to the matter. Was it not then obvious to suppose that I was prepared to deal with the passages in other plays, when I came to them? Could anything be more perversely uncharitable than to assume that I should not, and to accuse me, on this assumption only, of 'disregarding' evidence, to the sifting of which I had given more than a week's hard work? I repeat then that Mr Headlam's statement respecting my work upon αὐτός is a complete libel; and I say that it ought never to have been published.

Of malice in the common sense, of any ill-will to me personally, I entirely acquit Mr Headlam. I believe that he would have criticized any one else, as indeed he has done before now, upon similar principles. He is a very good scholar, as this pamphlet shows, and as most of us would assume without proof from the position which he holds. If he would address himself directly to the classics and let his contemporaries alone, he would produce work, which few or none would study with more interest and pleasure than I. But for judging the work of other students there never was in the world a man more completely disqualified. The first rule for a critic, as for any other judge, is that the *onus probandi* lies always on the accusation; that you are to suppose no fault, until it is proved, and never to suppose a great fault, if to suppose a smaller will account for the facts. Mr Headlam is incapable of this equity, and his practice is the very reverse. He construes everything against the prisoner, and as strongly as possible. For him, as I have just shown, facts not cited are facts not examined, and this, however strong may be the circumstantial evidence that the examination has actually been made. For him, as I shall now show, a proposition which may be taken in an untrue sense is a proposition which was intended to bear that sense, and this without regard to the context, the position of the writer, or any

other circumstance whatsoever. The following instance is typical, and is the only one, with which I shall deal in detail.

Mr Headlam charges me (p. 19—21) with ignorance of the facts about the common anapaestic dimeter. He cites these facts from familiar books, and implies truly enough, that no one, who had made serious studies in Greek tragedy, could be ignorant of them, but untruly more than enough, that I am thus ignorant. Without vanity I think I may say, that to most of my fellow-students this proposition would in itself have given some pause, that they would have examined the evidence for it with great severity, and would have preferred any other conclusion at all compatible with what I had written. Let us see then of what kind is the evidence.

In the *Seven against Thebes* is a dialogue (*vv.* 789—816) in which the text shows unusual signs of disturbance, and all commentators have suspected some more or less extensive interpolation. This dialogue concludes with a passage in anapaestic dimeters, which runs as follows:

ὦ μεγάλε Ζεῦ καὶ πολιοῦχοι
δαίμονες, οἳ δὴ Κάδμου πύργους
τούσδε ῥύεσθε,
πότερον χαίρω κἀπολολύξω 810
πόλεως ἀσινεῖ σωτῆρι,
ἢ τοὺς μογεροὺς καὶ δυσδαίμονας
ἀτέκνους κλαύσω πολεμάρχους;
οἳ δῆτ' ὀρθῶς κατ' ἐπωνυμίαν
καὶ πολυνεικεῖς 815
ὤλοντ' ἀσεβεῖ διανοίᾳ.

The conclusion at which I arrived, after an investigation as thorough as that which I have described in the case of αὐτός, was that almost all the dialogue is from another hand than that of Aeschylus, and that from this hand probably came the anapaests. This latter inference I based partly on the fact, that in the space of ten verses there are no less than three departures from the metrical practice of the poet, (1) the 'common' syllable at the end of *v.* 809 (τούσδε ῥύεσθε̆), (2) the anapaest following a dactyl (δυσδαίμονας ἀτέκνους), and (3) the inelegant rhythm of

the verse πόλεως ἀσινεῖ σωτῆρι, compared, for instance, with ἀτέκνους κλαύσω πολεμάρχους, which is of a better type. We cannot say with certainty, in the present state of the evidence, that Aeschylus could not possibly have broken, once in a way, any one of the practices against which these verses offend. I should myself say that in these matters such an absolute *a priori* certainty could never be safely assumed. But I thought, and still think, that the conjunction of the three irregularities is highly significant. I also thought, and still think, that, when I wrote, the significance of this conjunction had been seldom or never considered. I thought so partly because the commentators, whom I had before me, called attention to the first point, but did not call attention to the others, whereas, from my point of view, the three should be noted together; and partly because in Dr Wecklein's elaborate collection of conjectures I did not find the suggestion, to which such consideration would lead, that the anapaests were part of that interpolation, which all suspected in this region of the text.

Under these circumstances I wrote as follows:

809. τούσδε ῥύεσθε̆. The original ῥύεσθαι of the MS. (corrected by the writer himself) must apparently have been merely a common slip of the pen, due to the similar sound of αι and ε. The infinitive has no construction. By the strict rule deduced from the tragedians a long syllable is required, as this anapaestic metre does not allow 'common' syllables at the division of the verses. We may of course suppose (with Dindorf) that something is lost after ῥύεσθε (*e.g.* Σπαρτῶν τε πόλιν), or that the text is otherwise corrupt. But it has not apparently been observed that we have another, less obvious but still inadmissible flaw of metre in 812, as well as the unrhythmical verse 811. My own opinion, as given above, is that, instead of assuming an unusual extent of corruption in this place, we should accept the passage as it stands for a fairly successful imitation. Athens must have contained many men capable of writing fair verse, and also quite capable of ignoring a delicate observance such as the *Synaphea*.

I take this argument to be perfectly plain and perfectly sound, as far as it goes, whatever may be held as to the strength or necessity of the conclusion. I believe that if the note were submitted to a hundred average persons of competent knowledge, and they were asked to guess what serious fault had been found with it, they would be all at a loss.

But my critic (p. 19) is not at a loss to find a monstrous fault, nor ever need be, with such divining rods as he uses here. Tearing from the context the sentence "it has not apparently been observed that we have another less obvious but still inadmissible flaw of metre in 812," and fixing particularly upon the word "inadmissible", he not only construes this as an assertion that no example, certain or doubtful, of a dactyl followed by an anapaest can be found in Aeschylus or anywhere in the Attic poets, but actually proceeds to scold me for ignorance and wilful negligence exactly as he might have done, if I had said so in so many words. He cites from Hermann and Ahrens the evidence, familiar to me and all students, which shows that in a very small number of places the rule in question is or appears to be broken by the tragedians. (Mr Headlam would apparently count *one doubtful case* in Aeschylus, and one certain case, with others doubtful, in Euripides, with whose practice, since the problem before me was the genuineness of a passage in Aeschylus, I was not at all concerned). And he draws the charitable inference that I am ignorant of this evidence and of the books in which it is stated. Upon the same principle he might have gone on to attack me about the common syllable in ῥύεσθε: for whoever declares it certain, that no Attic poet, in any part of his works, ever once broke the rule which prohibits it, says more than the evidence warrants.

But I say that it is an abuse of criticism to construe in this way, for the purpose of founding an attack, the words which I use respecting either the one rule or the other. Construed fairly, and with due regard to the tenor and purpose of the argument, my words imply nothing but what is true, that both rules are very strong rules of Aeschylean practice, so strong that to find breaches of both, together with other violations of his style and practice, within ten anapaestic verses, lays the verses open to reasonable suspicion of their origin.

But the critic has another fault to find, and finds it in the same way:

> What we have here is an anapaest immediately succeeding a dactyl—a rare thing. Dr Verrall imagines it has escaped notice in this place...

Hereupon it is shown that the exception is noticed in Hermann's *Elementa Doctrinae Metricae*, and judgment is given accordingly. But where do I say that no one has recorded this exception? I am arguing that the passage is not genuine. I notice, as the commentators generally do, the breach of rule in ῥύεσθε. And I continue thus:

> But it has not apparently been observed that we have another, less obvious but still inadmissible flaw of metre in 812, as well as the unrhythmical verse 811. My own opinion, as given above, is that, instead of assuming an unusual extent of corruption in this place, we should accept the passage as it stands for a fairly successful imitation.

The fact of which I say that "it has not apparently been observed" is, as any one reading the note as a whole must feel and see, the fact material to my argument, the fact that the first irregularity is immediately followed by two others, so that we have three offences close together in this place. I did not mean and I did not say, with regard to any one of these irregularities in particular, that it had never been anywhere registered with other exceptions of the same class. Such notice is nothing to the purpose; because no one of the three exceptions, standing by itself in a passage otherwise unsuspicious, would afford ground for the inference to which I was leading. I thought indeed, and I still think, that the commentators (notwithstanding Hermann's *Elementa*) had been apt to overlook the collision of dactyl and anapaest; because several commentaries, which I consulted, agreed in noticing the flaw in ῥύεσθε and in not noticing the other, though both deserve notice, as departures from the practice of the poet, and deserve it alike. This is what I meant by the words "less obvious."

If my sentence means that no one had ever remarked the collision, then it also means that no one had ever shown dissatisfaction at the rhythm of πόλεως ἀσινεῖ σωτῆρι. Yet Dr Wecklein's appendix of conjectures (to which I refer incessantly and in such a way as to show that it was always under my eye) records no less than four emendations which change this rhythm and substitute one more satisfactory, and also one emendation which gets rid of the dactyl and anapaest. To these and others I allude, as might naturally be supposed, in the words "instead

of assuming an unusual extent of corruption in this place," and I cite one of them, expressly as "a specimen", in the note to *v.* 811. Where then is the ground for thinking that I imagined the matter to stand otherwise than as it actually and visibly did?

Now I do not by any means say—and I ask attention to this—that in point of expression my note is perfect, or that a reasonable critic might not find something to improve. Such a critic might say—it would be a punctilious and a dubious criticism, but not unreasonable—that, for a short description of the facts or apparent facts about the dactyl and anapaest in Aeschylus, "irregular" would be a better word than "inadmissible." This, I say, is dubious, for in truth the state of the evidence forbids us to decide which word best represents the feeling of Aeschylus on the point; "inadmissible" may be too strong, "irregular" is probably too weak. Either word might be used in this context without any other inaccuracy than inevitably arises from the impossibility of saying every thing at once, and without danger of deceiving any one who did not wish to be deceived. To write "irregular" would have been no protection to me, for then some other Mr Headlam, who happened to reject the one doubtful exception in Aeschylus which this Mr Headlam allows, might have remarked, that, if I had known anything about metre, I should have written "inadmissible." Nothing less than a page of irrelevant discussion would have prevented all possibility of misunderstanding and misrepresentation. Still it may be that, if I had written "irregular," I should have erred on the better side.

Nor should I complain at all of the remark, that although from the whole of my note it may be clear enough to what I refer when I say that "it has not apparently been observed," in the sentence itself this is not so clear as it should be, and that, to be quite perspicuous, I should rather have written something like this:

> But it has not apparently been considered that, in close conjunction with this metrical flaw, we have another in 812 and an unsatisfactory verse in 811.

Neither this nor any statement, suitable to the brief limits of a note, would bring in every relevant fact or be secure from such an inquisition as that of Mr Headlam. But this would have been a better form, and something better still might doubtless be devised by a more skilful hand.

But what I have to protest against, as an abuse of criticism and an injury to writers in general, is the manner in which my critic, instead of assuming that I possess ordinary knowledge, and therefore charging me with inexact or obscure expression, prefers rather to isolate an ambiguous phrase, to fix upon it the most erroneous meaning which it will bear, and so to bring out, in place of a light objection to style, an impeachment for incredible ignorance.

Against such presumptions and such constructions no writer would be safe. But this I will add; and as it is almost the only concession which I can make to Mr Headlam, I desire to make it amply and without reserve. If there is any writer who is safe against such a method, I am certainly not that invulnerable paragon. *Humanum est*, as it was said by some Professor of imperfect Humanity, *alius aliter errare.* My readiest way of erring, as I am but too well aware, is to use, particularly in subordinate propositions and *obiter dicta*, phrases too strong or too wide for the facts. This is not due always or usually, whatever Mr Headlam may think, either to ignorance or to want of labour. I believe (I am really vexed to talk of myself; but how can I help it?) that not many writers take more pains to be informed of their subject. I have described in full one specimen of my work, and it was not an exceptional case. I do of course make blunders. But much more often an inexact or misleading phrase in my writing is the result of trying to state briefly, for the purpose of a note, the result of an investigation, which in fact cannot be so represented. I will give one example of this, a case in which (except for the tone of the criticism, which is everywhere such as, I say boldly, I do not deserve) I have nothing to object to my critic. It is I who have deceived him and have done injustice to myself.

At *Theb.* 530 occurs the phrase Καδμείων ἕνα, usually construed as equivalent to Καδμείων τινά, *a Cadmean.* I think

this interpretation wrong and not agreeable to the usage of the poet, or indeed of the poets generally, respecting εἷς. The interpretation is matter of opinion, and I do not now wish to argue it. But as to the usage, to test my feeling, besides referring to two or three Lexicons, I went through the articles on εἷς in the indices to the tragedians, examining the references. This was of course no superfluity, but necessary for my purpose. In this investigation I set aside, as plainly not parallel to Καδμείων ἕνα in the sense supposed, all those cases of εἷς, in which the *one* specified is an individual named, or who could be named, and is *one* of *a fixed and permanent number.*

Thus in the *Rhesus* (393) we find παῖ τῆς μελῳδοῦ μητέρος, Μουσῶν μιᾶς, in *Rhes.* 891 Μοῦσα, συγγόνων μία, in Eur. *Hel.* 6 τῶν κατ' οἶδμα παρθένων μίαν Ψαμάθην, in *Ion* 1 Ἄτλας... θεῶν μιᾶς ἔφυσε Μαῖαν, and in *Cycl.* 21 παῖδες θεοῦ Κύκλωπες...τούτων (Κυκλώπων) ἑνός[1]. So Homer, as Mr Headlam says, writes very naturally χαρίτων μίαν Πασιθέην (*Il.* Ξ. 275); Pindar ἔγαμεν ὑψιθρόνων μίαν Νηρῇδων (*Nem.* 4. 65); Apollonius Rhodius Τερψιχόρη Μουσέων μία (4. 896). But these phrases are not parallels to Καδμείων ἕνα in the sense commonly put on those words in *Theb.* 530, *a Cadmean*, an individual not specified, nor specifiable, otherwise than as belonging to that fluctuating class. In *Rhes.* 393, for instance, Μουσῶν μιᾶς *one of the Muses*, is parallel, not to Ἀθηναίων τις *an Athenian*, but to εἷς τῶν ἀρχόντων *one of the archons.* These passages do not show that the writers were indifferent in their use of εἷς and τις (which was the point to which I was addressing myself); on the contrary the fact that several such instances occur in tragedy (whereas phrases like Καδμείων εἷς *a Cadmean* are, as I repeat, not found there) is evidence not against but in favour of the distinction between εἷς and τις for such purposes, which the

[1] As to Soph. *Ant.* 1066 τῶν σῶν αὐτὸς ἐκ σπλάγχνων ἕνα | νέκυν νεκρῶν ἀμοιβὸν ἀντιδοὺς ἔσει, I do not agree that ἕνα here means *some one;* I think that, as the rest of the sentence shows, it means strictly *one* (*for one*), and that to write τινά would have spoiled the expression. Ap. Rhod. 4, 1016 is parallel to Eur. *Med.* 945, Ar. *Eq.* 1300 to Soph. *Ant.* 269. Ar. *Vesp.* 1165 belongs to the class above discussed. As to *Ion* 1 see note there.

tragedians appear to have felt. In *Rhes.* 393, if the author had written Μουσῶν τινός, he would have changed the colour of his expression, as it seems to me, and changed it very much for the worse. And on the other hand, in *Theb.* 530, if Aeschylus had meant what he has been thought to mean, he should and would have written, not φῶτα Καδμείων ἕνα, but φῶτα Καδμεῖον, or φῶτα, Καδμείων τινα.

In the course of the investigation I noticed particularly that in several places, where εἷς might at first sight seem simply equivalent to τις *some one*, it is really equivalent to *quivis, any one*, and essential to the meaning intended. Mr Headlam allows that this is possible in all the cases I cite and others, though he does not agree; but of our disagreement another time, or not now. Having then completed my work, I put into my note the following parenthesis:

(It should be observed that εἷς is not found as a mere equivalent for τις: in the apparent examples it generally signifies nearly *quivis* 'any one, equal to one, merely one'; see Eur. *Med.* 945, *Or.* 264, *Bacch.* 917, Soph. *El.* 1342. In Soph. *Ant.* 269 λέγει τις εἷς ὃς πάντας κ.τ.λ. there is an antithesis between εἷς and πάντας, and so elsewhere.)

Now, to the substance of this statement, so far as the purpose of my note is concerned, I do not allow that any exception can be taken. But to the form of it two exceptions may be taken. In the first place, for "not found" I should perhaps have written "not found in authors comparable on such a point with Aeschylus," because I had not, and have not, ascertained precisely what are the limits in other Greek. I cannot think this a serious matter, because any one reading the parenthesis with the context (Mr Headlam takes it out, drops the marks of parenthesis, and considers it as a principal and separate statement) would see that I was thinking and speaking only of writers, whose use in such matters can be held to warrant a conclusion about Aeschylus. I could scarcely be bound to maintain for instance, that εἷς and τις were not used indifferently by Dion Cassius or Eustathius. The second exception is more important. I said nothing about such examples as Μουσῶν μιᾶς simply because I did not think them "*apparent* examples" of εἷς for τις: I thought it apparent that they were not such.

But, as I fully admit, this is not so apparent, that I could afford to leave it unexplained. That much is proved enough by the fact that Mr Headlam, a reader more than competent, did not see how I meant to dispose of these cases; and if he had called on me to explain myself further, he would have been perfectly in his right. Whether under all the circumstances it was judicious or considerate to conclude peremptorily that, because the critic saw no explanation, therefore I could have no explanation to give, or whether it was fair to collect a number, not very large, of such incomplete or imperfect statements, and to use them as secondary evidence in support of the charge that I do not know the elements of my subject and have taken no pains to learn them, are questions which I must leave to the judgment of the reader.

I do not see reason for going further into the details of Mr Headlam's book. A large part of it deals with matters of opinion, matters which according to my notions should never have been introduced into the body of an accusation, matters which I do not intend to discuss with any one who has taken the tone of an accuser. For instance, it is not to any person in the temper of Mr Headlam that I shall address myself, if I wish to defend further my suggested emendation of *Theb.* 1002 *τέθνηκεν οἷσπερ ὀρνέοις θνῄσκειν καλόν* (for *τέθνηκεν οὕπερ τοῖς νέοις*), based upon a note in the scholia. Mr Headlam gives three pages to this, but touches the base of my argument only in one sentence (p. 94), "The schol. refers to the line of Homer only as the most famous praise of fight in defence of one's country. The quotation is so familiar that there is no need for him to finish it." I, as well as Mr Headlam, know something about the scholia to Aeschylus; and I do not consider his explanation adequate. Of the judgment shown in my emendation Mr Headlam speaks in his invariable tone of contempt. I shall say only this. There are a few living Englishmen who, having achieved the feat, now very difficult, of suggesting a correction of Aeschylus both new and valuable, have a right to speak on such a matter. One of these is unquestionably Mr A. E. Housman. Mr Housman has declared in print that my emendation seems to him "highly probable." This does not prove that I am right; but it does

prove that the style assumed by Mr Headlam, here and elsewhere, is unfit for the subject and the persons concerned.

To form an opinion on Mr Headlam's accusation, it is necessary first to abstract all that large part of his 159 pages which deals with matter of opinion, and is distinguished in no way, except the asperity, from the common staple of discussion. All this, be it right or wrong, might have appeared just as well in the periodicals, and affords no reason or excuse for a hostile pamphlet. The not very large residue, if carefully examined in the light of the cases considered above, would support the conclusion that in several places, not many but all too many, I have written too briefly, too obscurely, or in such a way as might naturally mislead. This kind of fault is, I believe, inevitable in long, elaborate, and fatiguing work. I know that I could easily show examples of it in the works of others; and at any rate I am well aware that my own is not exceptionally free from it, but indeed quite otherwise. What Mr Headlam has done is to collect these faults, to construe and misconstrue them with pertinacious iniquity, to swell the apparent bulk of them with matter not relevant to an accusation, and to tack them to one or two statements, like that concerning my investigation of *αὐτός*, which, if they were true, would be really incriminating. But these incriminating statements are untrue; and it is untrue altogether that I do not know my subject, that I have neglected the means of information, or that I practise any other method than the one only scientific method which Mr Headlam, truly if somewhat ostentatiously, himself professes.

About the usefulness or propriety of such books as Mr Headlam's, elaborate works consisting entirely of attack and adverse criticism on a particular writer, I have myself a decided opinion. I think that they never, literally *never*, ought to be published or composed; and that it is practically impossible for such books to be just either to the subject or to the writer of them. No one, without injury to his temper and judgment, can dwell for laborious weeks and months upon that which, with or without reason, he dislikes and despises. Mr Headlam dislikes my writings. I can see plainly enough that I am not likely to give pleasure or instruction to him. In the various constitution of

minds this case will sometimes happen, without any particular fault on either side. He does not allow, and doubtless therefore he does not find, any substantial merit in me at all. This I sincerely regret; for I see much merit in him. But this being so, why can he not burn his copies of my volumes, buy no more, and work at the classics himself with the help of such writers as he finds to be helpful?

Mr Headlam, as I gather from his conclusion, would as a general rule think it undesirable that the expression of opinions about literature should take the form of his pamphlet. But he holds that my writings are a peculiar case, an insidious danger which calls for an exceptional remedy. "It would be easy to point out many whom their glitter has dazzled, fascinated, and seduced." I have not myself observed this crowd of obsequious victims. I should have said that I have received at least my share of contradiction. The truth I take to be this. Mr Headlam has noticed with displeasure that my works have been praised, and heartily praised, by many who are very unlikely to err with me, whose humanity errs, when it errs, in other and opposite ways. He draws the conclusion that these persons are under some glamour or spell, which prevents them from discerning that I am an impostor. My own explanation is different, simpler, and certainly kinder to every one concerned. It is that my writings, though they have doubtless faults of their own, have also merits of their own, and have rendered to many some not very common services. For the sake of these services, generous people, thinking perhaps that merit of any kind is not too common, and perhaps not sharing, for various reasons, the fear of Mr Headlam that I shall make too many go and do likewise, have forgiven me when I go wrong and will, I hope, continue to treat me as my efforts shall seem to deserve.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
Jan. 30, 1892.

CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. AND SONS, AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

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